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RESPECTING ONE'S OWN JURISPRUDENCE: A PLEA TO THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
This above all-to thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.
Hamlet, 1.3.78
On two occasions in the recent past, the International Court of Justice has
misstated its own prior holdings by selective quotation. In each instance, the
partial quotation was invoked as authority for the opposite of what the
previous Court had said. Neither matter was de minimis: in each instance, the
issue for which authority was being sought was central either to the case at
bar or to an important aspect of the Court's role. The consequences for the
future of international adjudication and the stability of authoritative expec-
tation, which is such an important strut of international law, are serious and
merit examination.
I. THE MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES CASE
In the nature of international adjudication, nonappearance by a defend-
ant state is not an uncommon occurrence. Article 53 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice deals with it explicitly.
1. Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or
fails to defend its case, the other party may call upon the Court to
decide in favour of its claim.
2. The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it hasjurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the
claim is well founded in fact and law.'
In the merits phase of the Military and Paramilitary Activities case,2 the
Court purported to restate its cumulative jurisprudence or case law on its
own responsibilities in testing the evidence required to establish an appli-
cant's case when the respondent state refuses to appear. "There is however
no question of a judgment automatically in favour of the party appearing,
since the Court is required, as mentioned above, to 'satisfy itself' that that
party's claim is well founded in fact and law."'
' For legislative history, practice and comments on Article 53, seeJ. ELKIND, NON-APPEAR.
ANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: FUNCTIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS, especially at 79-102 (1984).
2 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986
ICJ REP. 14 (Judgment ofJune 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
5 Id. at 24, para. 28.
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Judicial self-satisfaction on the law in a case of nonappearance is not a
serious obstacle. The Court recalled that in the Icelandic Fisheries Jurisdiction
case it had observed:
It being the duty of the Court itself to ascertain and apply the relevant
law in the given circumstances of the case, the burden of establishing or
proving rules of international law cannot be imposed upon any of the
parties, for the law lies within the judicial knowledge of the Court.4
In Nicaragua, the Court reaffirmed this view:
For the purpose of deciding whether the claim is well founded in law,
the principle jura novit curia signifies that the Court is not solely de-
pendent on the argument of the parties before it with respect to the
applicable law. . . , so that the absence of one party has less impact.5
Because the Court knows the law and is not, in any case, restricted to the
parties' legal arguments (in contrast to an adjudication on an agreed basis,
where, in the absence ofjus cogens, it presumably would be so restricted6 ), a
defendant's nonappearance would not seriously disable the Court in deter-
mining whether a claim is well-founded in law.
The situation is more complex with regard to the Court's self-satisfaction
on the facts, for the facts may be largely within the province of the parties.
In Nicaragua the Court took account of this difficulty yet reached the follow-
ing conclusion: "the Court cannot by its own enquiries entirely make up for
the absence of one of the Parties; that absence, in a case of this kind involv-
ing extensive questions of fact, must necessarily limit the extent to which the
Court is informed of the facts." 7
In the second clause here, the Court has edged away from the injunction
of Article 53(2), laying the basis for qualification and reduction of the
peremptory and unqualified requirement of the Statute that "[t]he Court
must. . . satisfy itself. . . that the claim is well founded in fact and law."
The Court continued:
It would furthermore be an oversimplification to conclude that the only
detrimental consequence of the absence of a party is the lack of oppor-
tunity to submit argument and evidence in support of its own case.
Proceedings before the Court call for vigilance by all. The absent party
also forfeits the opportunity to counter the factual allegations of its
opponent. It is of course for the party appearing to prove the allega-
tions it makes, yet as the Court has held:
"While Article 53 thus obliges the Court to consider the submis-
sions of the Party which appears, it does not compel the Court to
examine their accuracy in all their details; for this might in certain
Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Ice.; FRG v. Ice.), Merits, 1974 ICJ REP. 3, 9, and 175, 181
(Judgments of July 25).
Nicaragua, 1986 ICJ REP. at 24, para. 29.
b But cf. the Judgment of the Chamber in Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), 1986 ICJ
REP. 554, 557 (Judgment of Dec. 22).
7Nicaragua, 1986 IQJ REP. at 25, para. 30.
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unopposed cases prove impossible in practice." (Corfu Channel, IC]
Reports 1949, p. 248.)8
Thus, the Court significantly reduced the burden that Article 53 imposes
on it. If the Court is not obliged to examine the accuracy "in all their
details" (emphasis added) of the applicant's claims, certain claims may be
either accepted without being tested to the point of satisfaction that they are
well-founded or accepted without being tested at all, in other words, by
default.
The Court developed this amendato-y interpretation by itself reaffirming
the language of Article 53(2) and then ascribing the qualification to a pre-
vious Court whose holding is quoted. In invoking the Corfu Channel Judg-
ment as authority for a partial default judgment, the Court implied that it
was doing no more than restating a doctrine to which it had adhered for
some 40 years. In fact, the Court cited only one-half of the re'fevant sen-
tences in the Corfu Channel case and, in so doing, created the impression that
Corfu was holding something it did not hold. The pertinent section of Corfu
Channel states:
The position adopted by the Albanian Government brings into oper-
ation Article 53 of the Statute, which applies to procedure in default of
appearance. This Article entitles the United Kingdom Government to
call upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim, and, or the other
hand, obliges the Court to satisfy itself that the claim is well founded in
fact and law. While Article 53 thus obliges the Court to consider the
submissions of the Party which appears, it does not compel the Court to
examine their accuracy in all their details; for this might in certain
unopposed cases prove impossible in practice. It is sufficient fir the Court
to convince itself by such methods as it considers suitable that the submissions are
well founded.'
This section of Corfu concerned the methods to be used in fulfilling the
requirement of Article 53(2). The point it makes is obvious and innocuous:
in satisfying itself that the applicant's claim is well-founded, the Court must
resort to methods different from those which the absent defendant might
have used. The selective quotation in the Nicaragua case, which suppresses
the final sentence of the paragraph in Corfu, leaves the impression that it is
long-standing jurisprudence that the Court is entitled to reach judgment in
Article 53 cases without satisfying itself that the factual claims made by the
applicant state are well-founded. It is not.
II. THE PLO MISSION OPINION
In Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United
Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26June 1947, ° the United States and the
8Id.
9 Corfu Channel (UK v. Alb.), 1949 ICJ REP. 244, 248 (Judgment of Dec. 15) (emphasis
added).
10 Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988 ICJ REP. 12 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 26)
[hereinafter Mission].
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United Nations agreed that the proper interpretation of the Headquarters
Agreement precluded the United States from requiring the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization's Observer Mission at UN headquarters to close. It was
also clear that there was a dispute about the closing of the PLO's Observer
Mission in New York. If there were no dispute, it is difficult to see what the
parties were negotiating about. The question posed to the Court by the
General Assembly was whether, in the circumstances, the United States was
obliged to go to arbitration under section 2 1(a) of the Headquarters Agree-
ment. Section 21 (a) provides: "Any dispute between the United Nations and
the United States concerning the interpretation or application of this
agreement or of any supplemental agreement, which is not settled by negoti-
ation or other agreed mode of settlement, shall be referred for final decision
to a tribunal of three arbitrators ...."11
Issues were joined on an important legal question. The United Nations
claimed that, given an arbitration clause, once a dispute existed and one
party called for arbitration, the other party was obliged to arbitrate. The
United States did not really contest that point but claimed that notwith-
standing the existence of a dispute, the critical question was whether, in the
circumstances of the case, arbitration was appropriate at a particular mo-
ment. The United States contended in its written statement to the Court:
"The United States will take no action to close the Mission pending a
decision in that litigation. Since the matter is still pending in our courts, we
do not believe arbitration would be appropriate or timely."' 2
Thus, the central legal question of the case was whether arbitration had to
be compelled at that moment or whether an international tribunal had some
prudential discretion to determine whether it was appropriate or timely to
compel immediate arbitration or to postpone it or defer decision while the
parties resorted to some other mode of dispute resolution. Only if the legal
proposition that there was prudential discretion was sound would the Court
reach the factual question of whether the circumstances of the case war-
ranted its exercise.
The Court rejected the U.S. legal contention:
The Court could not allow considerations as to what might be "appro-
priate" to prevail over the obligations which derive from section 21 of
the Headquarters Agreement, as "the Court, being a Court of justice,
cannot disregard rights recognized by it, and base its decision on con-
"Agreement Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, U.S.-UN, June 26, 1947,
61 Stat. 3416, TIAS No. 1676, 11 UNTS 11, 22 U.S.C. §287 note (1982).
2, Mzssion, 1988 ICJ REP. at 29, para. 39 (emphasis added). Despite the fact that the case was
largely briefed and pleaded in English, the Court designated French as the authentic language.
Id. at 35, para. 58. The translation of this part of the judgment is not felicitous. The statement
"we do not believe arbitration would be appropriate" is rendered in the authentic version as
'nous pensons qu'un arbitrage ne serait pas opportun." Id. at 29, para. 39. Five lines later, the
word "opportunit6" in the important quotation from the 1930 Free Zones case (see note 14 infra)
was rendered in English as "expediency." That is an accurate translation, but the translation of
-appropriate" in the U.S. pleading as "opportun," viz. "expedient," in this setting does not
capture the implication of the U.S. pleading. This interlinguistic adjustment, however, does
make Free Zones quotable in this context.
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siderations of pure expediency" (Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District
of Gex, Order of 6 December 1930, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 24, p. 15). "
The impression created by the quotation from the Free Zones case is that
jurisprudence of more than 50 years' standing holds that, in determining
the appropriate moment for compelling arbitration, the Court is precluded,
by its nature as a court, from considering and taking account of prudential
factors such as the appropriateness and timeliness of arbitration in the par-
ticular case.
Once 'again, the Court, by selective quotation, created exactly the oppo-
site impression of what the Court in the precedent invoked had actually said.
Consider the exact words of the Permanent Court in Free Zones:
and although the Court, being a Court of justice, cannot. disregard
rights recognized by it, and base its decision on considerations of pure
expediency, nevertheless there is nothing to prevent it, having regard to the
advantages which a solution of this kind might present, to offer the ,Parties, who
alone can bring it about, afurther opportunityfor achieving this nd."4
In the Mission opinion, the Court quoted only a dependent clause and sup-
pressed the most important part of the prior Court's holding. Deleting the
conjunction "although," which introduced the quoted clause, obscured the
fact that this fragment was only a dependent clause, a syntactical construc-
tion that is invariably qualified, if not contradicted, by the independent
clause it accompanies.
CONCLUSION
The issue of concern in these cases is not whether the Court was right in
the substance of its innovations, but whether it was right in its treatment of
its own prior jurisprudence. The criticism is not directed to the fact that the
Court has seen fit to change prior holdings. No modern law is inscribed in
stone with the vaunted finality of the decrees of the Medes and the Persians.
Law is conformity and conformation: conformity with the past and confor-
mation for the future. 5 The International Court is entitled, if not obliged,
to reconsider prior holdings and to bring them into conformity with current
community goals and policies.
13Mission, 1988 ICJ REP. at 29, para. 40.
', Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 1930 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 24, at 15
(Order of Dec. 6) (emphasis added). The authentic language of the judgment was French and
read as follows:
Consid~rant. . . que si ]a Cour, 6tant une Cour dejustice, ne peut faire abstraction de
droits reconnus par elle pour se d&erminer seulement par des consid6rations de pure
opportunit6, rien ne l'empche, vu les avantages que pourrait presenter une solution de ce
genre, d'offrir aux Parties, qui, seules, peuvent la r~aliser, une nouvelle cccasion d'at-
teindre ce but.
' Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 46-47 (1973),
reprinted in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 252, 297-98 (J. N. Moore ed.
1974), and M. S. McDOUGAL & W. M. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAw ESSAYS 142, 182
(1981).
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It is certainly arguable that these cases may havejustified such d6marches,
for the issues in each were far from simple. The facts of the Mission case may
have warranted the exercise of the Court's prudential power to "compel"
arbitration at that moment, though the wisdom of a judicial declaration of
the absence of discretion in future matters of this sort is not immediately
apparent. The policy problem presented to the Court by American nonap-
pearance in Nicaragua was especially formidable. Article 53(2) obliges the
Court to satisfy itself that the applicant's case is "well founded." That may
require extensive fact gathering by the Court itself or rejection of the case
when neither the applicant nor the Court can satisfy the judges that the
claim is factually well-founded. The first alternative is burdensome, espe-
cially in a court where the judges have neither trial experience nor, for the
most part, prior judicial experience. The second alternative could produce
judgments that reward defendants for not appearing. Perhaps there were
grounds for judicially amending the Statute to deal with a contingency that
was unforeseen at the time of drafting. Reasonable people may disagree on
that. But they will agree that when revisions are necessary, they ought to be
effected with clarity and candor and their underlying policies made express.
The morality of case law, like all law, rests on respect for expectations that
have been established and authorized by appropriate community processes.
A court cites its prior holdings, even when it is not institutionally required to
do so, to affirm this commitment and to reinforce expectations of authority.
That expectation is a fortiori critical for a court whose jurisdiction is con-
sensual. When a court plays fast and loose with its own case law, it under-
mines the confidence of others in its reliability, deters litigants from resort-
ing to it and reduces in consequence its own potential contribution to the
community.
Two cases do not constitute a pathologie constante, but they come alarm-
ingly close. One hopes that the Court will reconsider this emerging practice
and treat its own jurisprudence with the care and respect it deserves.
W: MICHAEL REISMAN
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